VALE BRIGADIER JAMES HARGEST by AARON FOX
Brigadier James Hargest was an incredible individual.
He was a member of the local mounted volunteers before he joined the Southland Mounted Rifles with the creation of the Territorial Force in 1911.
He enlisted on 12 August 1914, and arrived at Anzac with the rest of the SMR contingent of the Otago Mounted Rifles. His leg wound received on Bauchop’s Hill on 6 Aug 1915 was enough to get him evacuated to Egypt, but he was actually returned to NZ for a spell, to recover his health and regain his strength in general. A number of officers were returned to New Zealand late in 1915 for the same reason, in the hope that a sea voyage and time in New Zealand would prove beneficial, after their health suffered from a bad diet and dysentery.
He made a name for himself on the Somme in September 1915, and again on the Somme in 1918 during the German Offensive and the final defeat of the German army from August 1918. He was wounded (not shell-shocked) by German shellfire at the Forest of Mormal on 5 November 1918.
He was a successful local politician and farmer in the 1920s, then entered national politics and helped form the National Party. He may well have been National’s first Prime Minister had he survived the war. Certainly that was his intention.
Hargest applied for active service in 1939, as he was one of the senior Territorial Force officers still on the active list. He was not too old to command (he was a contemporary of Erwin Rommel and Eugen Meindl), nor did he pull political strings to finally take command of 5 New Zealand Infantry Brigade (2nd Echelon, 2 NZEF) in 1940. The findings of a second medical board were sent to Major-General Bernard Freyberg for a final decision, and he determined that he needed Hargest’s experience (military and political) to help form 2 New Zealand Division.
Brigadier Hargest commanded 5 NZ Brigade in 1940 and 1941- in England, during the Battle of Britain, in Greece in April 1941, on Crete in April/May 1941.
As with many officers he was exhausted after the fighting and evacuation from mainland Greece, and then the anxious weeks of preparation on Crete for the German assault. His defensive positions expanded from Platanias (where his battle HQ was established in late April 1941) through to Maleme and Tavronitis. He inherited the defensive positions in and around Maleme, established by the Welch Regiment, and Naval, Royal Marine and Royal Air Force personnel. His brigade was reduced in strength end equipment after Greece, and the communications on the island were primitive. Arrangements for the defence of the Platanias-Maleme sector were based, in part, on Hargest’s experience of the Battle of Britain, when his 5 Infantry Brigade was based in England to assist in defending against German airborne and seaborne invasion.
The defence of Maleme on 20 May 1941 was brutally effective. Hargest suspected that the paratroop assault had been destroyed, and thought that aircraft movement on 21 May represented the withdrawal of paratoop forces. He committed those reserve forces at his disposal on the night of 20/21 May after Lt Col Les Andrew advised him that 22 Battalion would pull back on Hill 107 – but not withdraw. He then suffered the delays by 2 NZ Division HQ in organising a counter-attack by elements of 4 Brigade on 21/22 May. Bob Dawson, his Brigade Major was sent forward on 20 May to help stiffen the resolve of 22 and 23 Battalions, while Hargest remained at his battle HQ at Platanias where he was in communication with Brigadier Edward Puttick, in temporary command of 2 NZ Division.
His Brigade Headquarters was overrun at Sidi Aziz near Bardia, in November 1941, where he was captured, and met General Rommel – on Rommel’s wedding anniversary. Hargest was imprisoned with a selection of British and South African generals first at the Villa Orsini near Sulmona, then at Castello Vincigliata near Florence. He and Reg Miles escaped to Switzerland, and they then broke their parole to complete their escape through occupied France to Spain. Miles made the trip first, only to commit suicide in Spain. Hargest followed along the same route, and made it to England via Gibraltar.
After arriving in England he wrote his book, lectured on Occupied France, found out about the death of his son 2nd Lt Geoff Hargest, and became an observer with 50th (Northumbrian) Division in Normandy. He was killed in action on 12 August 1944 – 30 years to the day after he had enlisted with 1NZEF.
Many commentators on the Battle of Crete are strong critics of Hargest as a military commander. Those who knew him well remained fierce defenders of his military reputation after his death. It is easy to criticise – and therefore dismiss – Hargest as a farmer-politician. Then Brigadier George Vasey thought Hargest on Crete was ‘a very good fellow, but rather prone to conference instead of making his own decisions’. Vasey thought his work with Hargest in organising the rearguard of the retreating CREFORCE personnel was ‘one of the better shows I did’.
PETER ADAMIS RESPONDS
I have read Aaron Fox’s letter and I must say that I agree with him. Aaron Fox (Dr) is correct in his letter.
The information provided by him is well known and available online.
I believe the article submitted by me is to provide another point of view based on the testimony of Major General Sandy Thomas who was at the Battle of Crete and had first hand knowledge.
In response, I would like to add the following:
The Battle of Crete was one of great courage, duress, poor communication and few errors of judgement.
Freyberg knew well in advance of German paratroopers being used against the allied forces on Crete due to information being transmitted to him via Ultra (The allies had broken the German High Command battle codes).
The New Zealanders fought bravely at Maleme Airfield and it is fair to say that Freyberg knowing the vital ground must be held at all costs.
He entrusted his most battle-hardened experienced commanders to it, Hargest and Andrews.
Both Hargest and Andrews knew of its importance and fought bravely throughout the battle to retain control of the airport.
Andrews who was a battle-hardened veteran knew exactly the resources he had at his disposal and as such advised Hargest of the difficulties he faced.
Hargest despite the fog of war sent a company of infantry as reinforcements that evening.
“By which time Andrews had decided his position was not defensible in daylight and withdrew his units”.
As a result, “the capture of the airfield allowed the Germans to establish a strong foothold on their otherwise tenuous positions”.
Board of studies conducted after any battle seeking to find the reasons for success or otherwise will always find reasons for a negative outcome.
Seeking scapegoats in my view is not a panacea for decisions taken during battle unless one was actually at the battle site.
Therefore, to blame Brigadier Hargest and LtCol Andrews on the loss of Maleme Airport is somewhat harsh and unjust even by his own peers.
Their bravery and courage should not be under question for both were proven warriors and had distinguished themselves under fire on more than one occasion.