Since the turn of the millennium, things have been quiet in the Balkans. In spite of an unjust bombing of Serbia to amputate Kosovo for the Albanians, the past nearly two decades have been largely peaceful, with frozen conflicts remaining frozen. The credit boom of early Euroland, the bubble expansion of the Greek economy, and the enlargement of the European Union (EU) all caused a rising tide lifting all ships.

Certainly, there were occasional heatwaves, causing a few thaws. In 2001, FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) nearly collapsed into a civil war, as Slav Orthodox and Albanian Muslim agitation erupted into open conflict, which ended after the Albanians nearly succeeded in turning FYROM into a joint, dysfunctional state. Low intensity conflict continued in Kosovo, as the Albanians cleansed the Serbs from the province, and vandalised priceless Serbian monuments. While Greece and Turkey enjoyed a peace dividend after the so-called ‘Earthquake Diplomacy’ of 1999, there were still airspace violations, even as Greek investment trickled in, and Turkish soft culture blanketed the Balkans. Elsewhere, Bosnia remained a dysfunctional whole, a charity case wherein unemployment and corruption are rife, and the only thing being built, it seems, are churches and mosques financed from abroad.
Things started to change as the economy went south. The Greek economy began its nosedive in 2009, with knock-on effects elsewhere in the Balkans. Turkey’s Erdogan, once the model Islamic democrat, moved inexorably towards cronyism, and soft power yielded to a mailed fist. Bad economic times increased the already chronic outflow of Serbs, Bosnians, Bulgarians, and Greeks to other parts of Europe, even as the demographically expansionist Albanians increased their territorial footprint within Serbia, Montenegro, and FYROM.

Now, several factors may be colluding to produce a violent thaw in the near future. There is a sense that Bosnia, a confederal state with deep poverty and corruption, is on its last legs. The Serbian portion is growing in assertiveness, asking the perfectly logical question of why they should not secede and join Serbia if the Serbian province of Kosovo was allowed to secede. Bad policy in the past is not forgotten and is sowing the seeds of future conflict.

While FYROM as of this article seems to have formed a government after several months without one, it was not without a violent confrontation wherein supporters of the former president, Nikola Gruevski, stormed parliament and roughed up the opposition leader (now president) Zoran Zaev. Albanian parliamentarians sang the Albanian national anthem. Peace is balanced on a knife’s edge and nobody knows what will finally tip the balance, yet when it occurs, nobody will be surprised.

To the north, Serbia and Albania are increasingly at daggers drawn over the status of Kosovo, the Serbian enclave of North Mitrovica in Kosovo, and the aggressive behaviour of Albanians in southern Serbia. The Albanians have threatened to unite Kosovo and Albania, and they have openly agitated for joining parts of Serbia to Kosovo/Greater Albania. Serbs’ willingness to tolerate these provocations is wearing thin, and there, like elsewhere, politicians make political hay by playing the nationalist card. Given the degree of penetration of politics into society (political party membership in Serbia and elsewhere, is often key to getting a job or entering university), the populace has a vested interest in supporting politicians. It makes for a dangerous state of affairs.

Though Albanians talk of grabbing Greek Epirus, the real danger for Greece (and, increasingly, Bulgaria) is Turkey. The ‘Soft Power’ Turkey of the early millennium is gone. Turkey today is a breath away from a religiously-tinged dictatorship promising repression at home and aggression abroad. Threats against Greece, Syria, and Bulgaria are becoming commonplace, and the open questioning of Turkey’s borders and treaty obligations are de rigueur in today’s Turkey. Turks are constantly challenging Greek airspace and territorial waters, yet they also have another very potent weapon: refugees. Turkey has well over three million refugees desperately knocking at Europe’s gate. Turkey could simply push them into rafts towards Greece, where the islands are already overwhelmed by the influx. Given a huge wave of desperate refugees, a humanitarian disaster is almost assured; beyond rendering these highly militarised islands incapable of self-defence, by sowing utter chaos in Greece, the Turks could fight the Greeks down to the last economic migrant.
Beyond just implicit and explicit threats to Greece and Bulgaria, the Turks have great influence in Albania, providing economic, political, and military support. An implosion of FYROM would likely have a Turkish reaction, perhaps even a demand couched as an offer to act as an ‘honest broker’ to keep the peace, perhaps with boots on the ground. The experience in Cyprus should show that once Turks arrive, they never leave. Further, while Turks have been nominally friendly to the aspirations of the Slav Macedonians, they will always support their fellow Muslim Albanians over the Slav Orthodox. The Turks are, of course, also active in largely Muslim Kosovo and Bosnia. The Turks will hardly be neutral should conflict erupt between the Bosnian Muslims and Serbs, or Albanian Muslims and Serbs. A Turkish presence in the area would require a reaction from Greece and Bulgaria. Bulgaria too must worry about the reaction of its very large Turkish and Slav Muslim minority: nearly 20 per cent of the country’s population.

The Balkans, of course, are never left only to their own devices. As always, larger powers are involved. Here too, much has changed in the past few years, and none of it for the better. The EU was an aspiration for many Balkan states, with the promise of membership if the economy reformed and for general ‘good behaviour.’ Now the EU is in a deep malaise, Britain is leaving, and the promise of prosperity is now a reality of austerity; the main value of the EU is a passport to work further west. There is every possibility that the region may be left to its fate by a toothless EU, sealed off as sure as the razor wire that runs along the Serbian-Hungarian border.

‘Mother’ Russia, the supposed protector of her Orthodox ‘children’ in the Balkans, is largely absent as a productive investor in the region, aside from real estate transactions in Montenegro and Greece. Russian oligarchs generally have a corrosive effect in all of these countries, and Putin hardly lets religious affinity interfere with deals with Turkey; not even the corpse of a Russian pilot downed in Syria changed that. Russia is a dubious ally if you are a Balkan Orthodox; Great Power politics with Turkey always did and will continue to take precedence.

What of the world’s only superpower, the US? This is perhaps the most destabilising factor of all. While Trump has occasionally said Serbia should not have been bombed and he assured Greek Americans gathered at the White House Greek Independence Day ‘Selfie Party’ that “he loves the Greeks,” he is soon to invite Erdogan, who he congratulated for his victory in Turkey’s democracy-strangling referendum, to the White House. A prominent Republican congressman called for the partition of FYROM and a general redrawing of frontiers. At the same time, Trump wants to disengage from Europe, and though some may think that this is a good thing, as NATO bombed Serbia and failed to advocate for Greece against Turkey, the absence of America may encourage the many troublemakers in the region.

The Balkans are, as ever, complicated. There is too much history on too little land, and the land has too many claimants. Though the Balkan peoples have much in common, they have allowed themselves to be divided; they have not learned from history. Often enough encouraged by Great Powers, they have focused on conflict rather than cooperation. Most of these conflicts are interconnected. Crises will not happen in a vacuum and will draw in other states, minorities, Great Powers, and Superpowers. The thaw is coming, absent leadership both within the Balkans and without. Given the thickness of local leaders, and global ones, optimism is hard to find.