The Department of Foreign Affairs of Greece is seeking public recommendations for its updated version of its strategic plan for Ecumenical Hellenism for the period 2024 – 2027. The plan continues to define the various diasporic communities around the globe only in terms of their “homeland,” that is, Greece, without taking into consideration, as thinkers like Yorgos Anagnostou correctly point out, that diasporas are outcomes of cross-cultural encounters and identities, involving management of historical memories and outcomes of unequal historical negotiations, defined mostly by dominant groups.
The new “ambitious” plan is a declaratory statement of goals and policies that continues to ignore Greece’s limited tools and the limited scope and capabilities institutionalised Greek diasporic communities abroad have to implement a comprehensive diasporic policy in unison. The revamped plan “appropriates” political initiatives of past decades and is only available in Greece, making it inaccessible to most diasporic Greeks.
Also, a media campaign does not support the consultation process to ensure that Greek diasporas become aware of this policy paper and contribute accordingly. The updated plan incorporates a few “secondary” proposals submitted by organisations and individuals during the initial consultation in February-March 2024.
The basic orientation remains unchanged and Greece-centric. The new draft still refers to a Greek government vision for Greeks abroad to have a relationship with the “metropolitan centre”, as they call Greece.The updated plan continues to advance, as the Department of Foreign Affairs’s exclusive goal is to promote and strengthen Greece abroad via an improved international image, diplomacy, promotion of geostrategic interests, etc. For example, there are no specific policy initiatives on how the rhetorical references to a two-way relationship between Greece and its diasporic communities can work through synergies that aim to meet the educational, cultural, political and economic interests of the diverse Greek diasporas of the world, in their homelands/countries of permanent residency, and Greece. The plan remains one of its six main priorities: the “maintenance and strengthening of ties with the ecclesiastical institutions of Orthodoxy”.Ignoring that the Church, as well as the institutionally constituted Greek microcosms and organisations abroad, referred to as the implementers of the plan, do not concern and do not affect the lives of the vast majority of ecumenical Greeks. People either live their lives in the private sphere, or live and participate primarily in mainstream institutions in their local communities.
A fundamental tool of the Greek government’s new attempt to upgrade its relationship with the diasporas continues to be the use of digital technologies. For example, better interconnectivity and networking are expected via the launching of the diaspora.gr website. What is primarily needed, though, is an expanded conceptual, long-term theoretical and practical strategy, along with similar supportive legislative initiatives, appropriate staffing of key institutions that will support the relationship between Greece and Ecumenical Hellenism over time, and allocation of relevant long-term funds from the state budget.
A key strategic component of Greece’s plan is networking with the professional, economic, and social diasporic elites, however, no reference exists to initiatives to upgrade the relationship with the broader, mostly “anonymous” communities of expatriates and diasporic Greeks.
The stated goal of upgrading, mostly digitally, the services provided by consular authorities is a positive development, provided that there are provisions and funds for their staffing. Furthermore, Greek consular authorities abroad need to function as cultural centres and not only as centres of “bureaucratic” support services for Greeks abroad. The references to creating voluntary registers of expatriates, expatriate organisations, businesses, and scientific personnel, convening a World Forum of Greeks of the Diaspora, or making a Fund for Greeks Abroad are old ideas that may serve valuable purposes as long as they aim to address the needs of both diasporic communities and Greece.
It is worth highlighting that all the initiatives of identity interconnection and preservation, that is, history, culture, language, and all the components of “Greekness” described, originate from Greece! The diasporic communities are perceived as recipients of “Greekness” produced primarily in Greece and exported from the centre to the “peripheries” of Hellenism.
There is not the slightest hint to indicate that the Department of Foreign Affairs understands that “Greekness” can also be produced in transcultural and multicultural centres of Hellenism outside of Greece, as was the case in the past. The Department talks about preserving traditional “Greekness” as defined within Greece; it is not interested in enriching and expanding “Greekness” via the migratory, diasporic and transcultural experiences of Ecumenical Hellenism. Indicative “symbolic” signs of upgrading the relationship, such as establishing a specific and celebratory Expatriate Day and creating a museum for Greeks Abroad, will initially only be digital. They are welcomed, but not enough.
It is time that the immigrant and diasporic dimension of Hellenism becomes part of Greece’s national narrative, with obligatory horizontal initiatives aiming to promote this new philosophy. For example, all aspects of life that emanate from and are experienced in the various diasporic communities around the world can be integrated as knowledge into all levels of the Greek education and cultural system.
The transcultural wealth of Ecumenical Hellenism can be used to devise policies that will help Greece better manage its multicultural 21st-century society. Finally, the declared aim is to explore the possibility of teaching Greek in state schools (USA and Canada) and the need to take initiatives so that Greek entrepreneurs can support Greek studies abroad.
These intentions are positively assessed. Private initiatives alone are not enough to meet existing, let alone future, needs. Asking Greece’s private sector to do what the state does not wish to do to the extent needed is an abdication of national responsibility.
Over the past twenty years, Greece’s policy for its diasporic communities has been significantly downgraded. There are no funds to cover basic policy “priorities.”
There is also no public, political, or academic debate regarding diasporic policy areas, either in Greece or in the diasporic communities. This may indicate the diasporic communities’ weakening cultural, political, economic, and societal ties with mainland Greece and vice versa. However, without a bilateral reflective engagement, we won’t be able to expect better days.
Kostas Karamarkos was a senior adviser to the General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad.