The EU, until recently synonymous with efficiency and innovation appears to have been caught off-guard during the current crisis; giving the impression of an ambivalent organisation making it up as it goes along. However, what if Europe didn’t have to make “it” up? What if the EU strategically planned not only to bolster Europe’s economic security, but also to shore up the long-term future of Europe’s political and human security as well? What if the EU endeavoured to move beyond the troika’s current ground-hog day/road-to-nowhere austerity ‘tonic’ and address some of its own internal contradictions? Could the answer to “it” therefore be a move towards political federalism?
In many ways the very proposition of deeper integration towards a fully-fledged federalised Europe seems impossible, particularly now at such a volatile time in the EU’s history. Even if one puts the current Euro-zone crisis aside for the moment and acknowledges Europe’s efforts as the continent that both formalised the concept of the modern nation-state, as well as the continent that has come closest to discarding this idea, in favour of a truly post-modern alternative. Even then, a federal Europe is still hard to imagine. One need only reflect on Europe’s strained history to understand why.
Teetering under Europe’s surface has always been a deep culturally entrenched concern over the issue of sovereignty, in the very broadest sense of the word. Europeans throughout the ages have grappled and at times often quite viciously, with issues regarding dominion over specific areas, the extent of jurisdictions, degrees of power, types of rule, methods of control, not to mention bitter and often brutal struggles for independence, autonomy and self-government. Europe boasts an endless catalogue of commemorative monuments that stand testament to a very bloody and divided history, a physical and permanent reminder that at the heart of Europe: North/South, East/West, rich/poor lays a complex and multilayered tribalism yet to be extinguished.
With this tribalism in mind, perhaps the crucial question should not be whether Europe is capable of redrawing its own map? But rather, whether Europeans themselves are actually willing to go down the path of political supra-nationhood? And if so, who ultimately will be charged with making such a momentous decision? The EU stands at a fork in the road. If Federalism is to be genuinely considered as an avenue to try and get Europe out of its current malaise will it be an organic process from below, a democratic call from Europe’s many; or one imposed from above, a technocratic decree from Europe’s few?
An organic move from below conjures up utopian images of a United States of Europe; whilst an imposed edict from above invokes more cynical visions of Empire. In either case, the one certainty is that Europe can no longer afford to ignore the hard questions linked to its political status. Simply put, any addressing of Europe’s economic woes, must also simultaneously readdress the political relationship EU members have to one another and the overall philosophy that underpins the EU and binds these members together.
With all this in mind, before proceeding any further to examine where the EU is possibly going, perhaps here is a good time to pause and reflect on where the EU actually currently is. At present, the EU finds itself in an unworkable situation, the impasse largely due to an inherent flaw. At its core structural level the EU suffers a defect, conceived at its inception when economic union was implemented without political union. The question naturally begs, how is it possible to sustain economic integration and yet still maintain independent political sovereignty? Answer – you can’t! Proof – the current EU crisis!
Furthermore, the EU also appears to find itself unable to accept its own predicament. The current EU crisis has always been a multifaceted problem, however, for too long now, the problem has gone misdiagnosed by many, solely as an economic one. As already mentioned, the EU crisis is in fact also a deeper philosophical puzzle, at the heart of which lays a crucial question about social responsibility, namely do societies exist to serve the global economy, or does the global economy exist to serve our societies? Likewise, the EU crisis is also a political conundrum revolving around the complex relationships its members have with one other, namely can democratisation ever trump realpolitik?
In turn, if the answers to these questions are indeed political Federalism, then three further fundamental questions also emerge: (1) what could a political federalised Europe look like? (2) How would a political federalised Europe work? And (3) why should a political federalised Europe even exist?
What could a federalised Europe actually look like?
For some realists and pessimists (in many cases, often one and the same) a politically federalised Europe, if not discarded outright as too utopian, might only be comprehended in terms of material power. This model envisages any future EU as an imperial dystopia. Here Europe would morph into a grand alliance, although more ancient Athenian Empire and less Delian League in nature, with Germany more than likely as the hegemon or at the very least, a dual-monarch in a power sharing arrangement between the ‘Royal Houses of Berlin and Paris’. Other realist interpretations may foresee potential to experiment with more ethereal hegemonic stability theories. Here the model would still remain imperial. The slight difference though would be that under this model, Germany or a Berlin/Paris Pact would be elevated to a more benevolent authority in order to fulfill the role of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathian.
The question here though, is, does a politically federalised Europe need to be conceptualised in such terms reminiscent of Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue, where the strong effectively do as they wish? What if optimists (not the naive idealistic kind, but more of the genuine humanitarian variety) also had a say in what a federalised Europe could look like? Could the result ever lead to a possible Commonwealth of Europa?
In fact, if asked to seriously contemplate what a possible federal EU might look like, a potential Commonwealth of Europa could learn a lot from the very real Commonwealth of Australia. Granted on the surface these remarks seem quite audacious, particularly in light of the fact that Australia in many ways is still a relatively young society when compared to the chronicling of the achievements of its continental counterpart. Scratch the surface however, and three interesting considerations emerge:
Firstly, in regards to its indigenous history, Australia boasts the longest continuing living culture known to humanity. Therefore, Australia would not so much be the ‘child’ trying to school Europe the ‘parent’. Australia in this situation, can actually speak with some authority as the ‘wise elder’.
Secondly, Australia can also speak as an antipodean sibling. It is worth remembering that Australia’s modern History has often mirrored the tribal fault lines of Europe. In actual fact, many of Europe’s fault lines were exported directly to Australia via European diaspora communities, who over time have established themselves as part of the fabric of modern Australian society, but at the same, in many cases, have done so without ‘checking their historical baggage at the door’. Australia is therefore no stranger to Europe’s sectarian divides, ethnic rivalries and political quarrels. Furthermore because Australia was an arena in, which two distinctively different civilizations collided; as well as having an ever-evolving relationship with the Asian-Pacific region, Australia is also no stranger to European-style territorial disputes and identity politics. Not to mention Australia’s distinct parochialism, itself very much reminiscent of Europe’s own idiosyncratic regional divisions.
Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, in spite of these fault lines Australia does not have the same bloodstained history as Europe. That is not to deny the pain and suffering involved in some of the more bitterly contested struggles that have taken place throughout Australia’s history. But it also recognises Australia’s ability on many occasions to avert the chaos associated with a complete descent into civil-strife. In fact, as a direct result of this ability, Australian History is often accused of being “boring” and in many instances ignored because “nothing happened”. The point however is rather to the contrary. Australian History (specifically since Federation in 1901) is not “boring”, many “things” did indeed “happen”, it is the little acknowledged case though that Australia’s federal system has proven robust enough that when “things” have “happened” Australia’s federal structure – not all the time, but on many occasions – has proven durable enough to absorb the shocks, tremors and impacts from various social, political, economic and cultural forces.
Even in response to what is arguably considered Australia’s most politically contentious event, the Constitutional crisis of 1975, which saw Prime Minister Gough Whitlam dismissed from office; Australia did not descend into the violence that one would so often associate with the overthrow of a democratically elected leader. Sure some Australians ‘maintained the rage’* at least for a while, however, the vast majority of Australians on the other hand, when given the chance to send a message via the ballot box, actually voted Whitlam out and conferred the Prime Ministership onto Whitlam’s chief opponent Malcolm Fraser in a landslide victory. Point being, instead of 1975 remembered as a time of tanks and martial law, in what for all intense and purposes could be classed as a coup de tat, Australia’s political system was able to recalibrate itself and deal with the crisis in a way that averted major violence and social fragmentation.
Europe on the other hand, particularly of late, has had no such luck. If the EU is a patchwork, then its stitches have dramatically started to unravel. As unconventional as it seems then, perhaps it’s time Europe considered a federal model and even more uncustomary, perhaps it’s time Europe looked down under towards Canberra for its blueprint.
How would a political federalised Europe work?
Simply put greater democratisation. If the EU crisis has taught Europe anything, it should be that the concept of a problem being ‘exclusively national’ no longer exists. National problems, in light of a monetary union divorced of effective political coping mechanisms, have a tendency to exacerbate, and spill-over, creating much larger problems for the whole group. Simply put, national problems can no longer be contained within one country’s national borders. A well-funded, well-supported and genuinely democratic European Executive, Legislature and Judiciary however, could go some way in checking a repeat of the current crisis. To reiterate, it’s worked for Australia quite nicely since 1901. Why then couldn’t it work for Europe too?
Consider an EU where national domestic politics would represent the Local and State tiers of a conventional federal system like Australia, or the USA. Here issues specific to individual countries (or their provinces/regions/states etc) could still be taken care of within a country’s already established native branches of government. The only difference would be that any laws implemented would now be recognised as acts of state law, enacted within a broader EU Federal structure. Whilst, the high politics associated with what is traditionally deemed ‘the national interest’ would now be transferred and played out on a new Federal tier, with a truly representative European Parliament invested with genuine Executive authority and legislative capacity.
Here though we return to the fundamental tenet of Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue, why would Germany or even France (i.e. ‘the strong’) put a check on their own powers as leaders by supporting further democratisation within the EU? Whilst recent reports regarding high-level talks between Chancellor Merkel and President Hollonde suggest political Federalism might be an item of business on the EU’s future agenda, this should not be confused with a complete democratic and egalitarian overhaul of the EU’s political structures. For many, further democratisation simply is not in the interest of some of the bigger EU players.
What is in the interest of some of the bigger EU players however, is stability. Something Europe at present does not have, nor can the likes of Germany or the troika guarantee, largely because their relationship with Europe’s periphery economy member-states, has over the course of the last two years, been perceived by many as one more of antagonism, rather than reassurance.
Germany in particular would do well to reflect on its own immediate post-war reconstruction experience in particular, the way Washington personally profited from a policy of philanthropy towards Western Europe and specifically towards its efforts in assisting with the rebuilding of what was at the time, West Germany. Could History possibly be repeating itself? In light of the current EU crisis, surely Berlin stands more to personally gain from a policy of altruism rather than austerity. For Germany, Federalism should not be grasped as an ‘either-or’ option, where politicians and policy-makers try to rationalise whether or not democratisation trumps realpolitik or vice-versa. For the sake of the greater good, (incidentally, a greater good, which if established and sustained, big players like Germany stand to profit very handsomely from) democratisation ‘is’ realpolitik.
What about Europe’s periphery club? Surely a Federal Europe would always be greeted with suspicion, a ‘Trojan horse’ for the bidding of Europe’s economic powerhouses. Enter “the great compromise”. Here the interests of the EU’s smaller member-states would be safeguarded by establishing a chamber where EU delegates would legislate in a House with the same amount of representatives from each member-state, much like the Senate functions in Australia and the USA. In effect, an undemocratic compromise, where the majority would concede to the minority. Paradoxically though, this “great compromise” as it is referred to in American politics, actually exists to serve the interests of democracy overall. By Europe’s powerhouses conceding to equal power-sharing, the fear of ‘bullying’ felt by smaller member-states would be alleviated and in return encourages them to reciprocate in kind, with a willingness to cooperate.
Finally, why should a political federalised Europe even exist?
Firstly, consider the opposite. The alternative to political federalism is more uncertainty, which breeds resentment, which in turn could also tempt fate, inadvertently inciting an unnecessary and potentially devastating economic stalemate between EU member-states.
In addition, much like Australia’s own Federation story, Europe too could benefit from deeper, streamlined diplomacy, defence and immigration policies. A more uniformed approach in these areas could add (in fact, in light of the current crisis) would significantly go some way in helping to restore and enhance already existing economic, trade and transport links within the EU.
Culturally, federalism would obviously have to be negotiated in order to ensure Europe’s kaleidoscope of unique cultures are never extinguished. However, whilst many extreme nationalists would more than likely see Federalism as an attack on their national identity, Europe’s individual national characters are here to stay for a long while yet. Federalism could never, in fact, nor should it ever look to supersede national heritage. This is not within Federalism’s brief. Such a mandate can only come from Europeans themselves. Federalism can coexist with patriotism they need not be seen as mutually exclusive entities.
Furthermore, would engendering a growing sense of common European identity be such a bad idea? Surely it would assist in mending the present internal divisions within the EU, not to mention potentially burying the demons of Europe’s past tribal nationalisms. In fact a workable, culturally-sensitive Federalism could possibly diffuse some of the more banal aspects of the latter and over time even convert Europe’s more extreme seething nationalisms, into a more subdued parochialism.
Finally, the EU is simply in too deep. Ultimately, Federalism equals self-preservation for everyone. The hypothetical scenarios associated with a Grexit were mind boggling enough, let alone trying to comprehend the practical requirements necessary to dismantle the entire Euro zone; or the ramifications from the failure to effectively do so if the need ever arose. In fact, all speculations suggest that failure to effectively execute the latter would reverberate across the whole global economy with a potentially disastrous flow-on effect more akin to a tsunami, than a ripple. In other words, the stakes are too high and the vested interests too many for the EU to be allowed to dissolve. Federalism therefore, is arguably the next logical progression in the EU’s evolutionary process.
Driving this progression is the power dynamic within the “Euro family”. The EU has a symbiotic relationship between its powerhouse members (large populations, large economies, solid manufacturing/export bases) and its periphery economy members. The powerhouses’ ‘good times’ are irrevocably contingent on their ability to value-add the euro. To do so, the euro in turn needs to be wedded to a prosperous Europe. But a prosperous Europe is only possible if periphery economies can be in a position to renegotiate their “bail-out” packages, in order to lift themselves up out of recession. Federalism in turn could harnesses both groups’ vested economic goals and their natural impulses to advance their own self-interests and use it to the advantage of the entire EU. In effect, what emerges is a two-way system of sponsorship and reconciliation; mutual ‘back scratching’ meets the maxim ‘from each according to their ability, to each according to their need’.
Federalism would bring periphery economies ‘inside the tent’? From ‘inside the tent’ EU powerhouses could sustain prosperity by using their superior structures, resources and capacities to better oversee and coordinate European transactions. This would not be done so much as a ‘big stick’, but rather more so as a ‘carrot’, essentially enhancing transparency and forcing both groups to ‘play nice’ for the common good. In turn, better positioning the EU as a whole to pre-empt and/or avert any future crises. Whilst for Europe’s periphery economies, once ‘inside the tent’, by its very nature, politically at least, they would no longer be on the periphery and thereby in a better position to renegotiate their conditions and voice any other concerns. For sceptics, cynics and pessimists, this is what democratisation would look like at the ‘coal face’. Like any meaningful relationship, it is built on respect for all, compromise in the interest of the greater good and a foresight on the ‘bigger picture’.
To critics of political federalism what is the alternative? Europe surely cannot persist the way it is. Nor can Europe be allowed to return to where it once was. One need only try to comprehend how Greece has gone from a nation with the smallest suicide rate in Europe, to a sharp, dramatic 40 per cent increase last year alone. With this in mind who could really want austerity, let alone another World War? The world has seen and many more have felt firsthand, the limitations of a monetary union that lacks the necessary supporting political union. Subsequently, there are also those still alive who can remember what a return to Europe’s former insular, ever-suspicious and tribal-self would feel like. Simply put, if ever there was a time for Europe and the world at large to show some empathy, it is now! Conversely, now is not the time for historical amnesia!
Conclusion – Is art imitating life?
In trying to comprehend the current EU crisis, the question begs is art imitating life? One could forgive Europe’s lost ‘700 euro generation’ and the ghosts of Greece’s austerity inspired suicide victims for thinking so; as daily life in Europe increasingly starts to resemble an Orwellian nightmare. Consider the famous scene in George Orwell’s Animal Farm where Clover and Benjamin make the startling revelation that the Seven Commandments of Animalism have been reduced to a single tenet: ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS. Replace Clover and Benjamin with Greece, Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Spain; and replace “ANIMALS” with “EUROPEANS”. The similarity is disturbingly uncanny. Two ambitious projects: one, a farm run by and for unyoked animals; the other, a regional union, in theory, run by and for member-states; both projects promising freedom, prosperity and solidarity, yet neither fulfilling their lofty pledges. Unlike Orwell’s fable however, the EU is an unfinished book. As a result, Europe is in a unique position to regroup, regain its lost momentum and go on to realise its full potential.
However, in regards to the EU’s narrative so far, the current crisis has chiefly been framed as an economic phenomenon, particularly in the mainstream public domains of the West. Few reports venture to deal with the human cost of austerity, even fewer reports dear to speculate what the future might bring. Whilst the decision to refuse to confront the micro issues of human suffering resultant from the macro decisions of closed-door conferences, summit meetings and crisis-talks is nothing short of moral reprehension; the reluctance to speculate on Europe’s future is more understandable. After all, the EU is in unchartered territory. It’s worth remembering though that Europe is no stranger to unchartered territory.
In fact, Europe has a long tradition of ambitious reinterpretations of itself. Alexander, Roman Emperors, ‘Barbarian’ invaders, Christian Kings, Byzantines, Catholic Popes, Protestant Reformers, Autocratic Absolutists, Enlightened Humanists, Napoleon, Hitler, Washington, Moscow and Brussels have all at some stage throughout history had their own vision of what an ideal Europe might look like. Each of them have imagined endless possibilities for Europe, some utopian, others abhorrent, almost all though, in response to a crisis, be it real or perceived. In turn, Europe once again finds itself in crisis and once again finds itself in need of an imaginative response. Europe confronts a ‘Gordian knot’ at once economical, political and philosophical. However, this time instead of an adventurous Alexander brandishing a sword, Europe needs a strategic EU, brandishing an open-mind, an inclusive agenda and a humanitarian heart.
Orwell’s tale deals with the corruption of power and concludes in civil-strife. European political Federalism need not revolve around such a cynical central theme. Similarly, with a genuine emphasis on the human security of the individuals who make up the societies of all of Europe’s member-states; the EU also need not conclude in such dire circumstances either. The EU therefore is at a cross-road. Will political Federalism be the EU’s next chapter, or rather will the current Euro-zone crisis be its last?
*‘maintained the rage’: Phrase coined by Gough Whitlam during campaigning for his re-election, post-dismissal.
Nicholas Melaisis is a secondary school educator in Melbourne, currently studying a Masters of International Relations. You can contact Nicholas on nmelaisis@gmail.com